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The paper first considers why central European countries wish to join EMU soon. The main 
reasons are the risk of macroeconomic instability they face outside the euro zone if they wish to 
grow quickly. At the same time, Central Europe is highly integrated as regards trade with EMU, so 
it  is  little  exposed  to  asymmetric  shocks  that  would  require  a  realignment  of  exchange  rates. 
Finally, it is argued that there is no cost in terms of slower growth from EMU accession, so that 
there  is  no  trade-off,  as  has  been  claimed,  between  nominal  convergence  to  EMU  and  real 
convergence to EU average GDP levels. Second, the paper assesses whether Central European 
accession to EMU would be disadvantageous to current members. It concludes that accession 
cannot increase inflationary pressure on existing EMU members, as has been claimed, but that 
slow growing members of EMU might suffer increased unemployment, unless they increase the 
flexibility of their labour markets. Incumbent members may also be unwilling to share power with 
Central Europeans in EMU institutions. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
1. Introduction1 
With EU accession now assured, the candidate countries are actively considering when to join 
the EMU. Unlike Britain and Denmark the new members will not have an “opt-out” - the right to 
remain outside the EMU indefinitely. The question is therefore only one of timing. A number of 
countries  have  already  declared  that  they  want  to  join  EMU  as  soon  as  possible  after  EU 
accession. The costs of such a move are minimal for Estonia and Lithuania, which already have 
their currencies “hard-pegged” to the euro through a currency board [Sulling 2002]2. Hungary and 
Poland have also announced that their aim is to satisfy the Maastricht criteria for EMU accession in 
2005, which would allow them to join during 2006 or January 2007. On the other hand, the Czech 
government  has  declared  that  it  does  not  foresee  early  EMU  accession3.  The  European 
Commission  [Financial  Times,  10  Oct.  2002]  and  the  Bundesbank  [Bratkowski  and  Rostowski 
2002, Financial Times, 26 Sept. 2000] have also made clear their lack of enthusiasm for new 
members joining the EMU quickly. 
What are the reasons pushing many applicant countries towards early EMU entry, and why are 
some key players in Western Europe opposed to it? We divide the discussion into seven sections. 
Section 2 describes the macroeconomic risks to which central European countries are exposed 
while  they  remain  outside  the  EMU.  Section  3  assesses  the  standard  optimum  currency  area 
(OCA)  criteria  for  whether  these  countries  are  ready  for  EMU  accession.  Section  4  considers 
whether  there  is  a  trade-off  for  central  Europeans  between  joining  EMU  and  real  economic 
convergence  with  the  EU.  Section  5  addresses  some  arguments  which  claim  that  Central 
European  accession  to  EMU  would  be  bad  for  current  EMU  members.  Section  6  considers 
institutional issues and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Risks of Macroeconomic Instability Outside the EMU 
In earlier papers we have analysed the difficulties faced by the more advanced central and 
east European countries (CEECs) in achieving macroeconomic stability in the run-up to EU and 
EMU membership [Rostowski 2000], and have presented the case for unilateral euroization as a 
                                                  
1 I wish to thank a referee for very useful comments. 
2 Estonia has argued that it should be able to join EMU earlier than 2006, since it has satisfied the Maastricht 
Treaty’s exchange rate criterion ever since the ratification of the Treaty and the interest rate criterion for many years. 
These are the two criteria which need to be satisfied for two years. The exchange rate criterion requires that the value of 
the applicant country’s currency remain within the range required by the ERM2 relative to the central parity (plus or 
minus 15%) for a period of two years, without a devaluation of the central parity.  The interest rate criterion requires that 
interest rates on long term (ten year) government bonds not exceed the average of the three countries with the lowest 
inflation by more than 2 percentage points. The remaining criteria are: (1) that inflation should not exceed the average of 
that in the three best performing members of the EMU by more than 1.5% for one year; (2) that the fiscal deficit should 
not exceed 3% of GDP, and (3) that gross public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP. 
3 This is because of the government’s desire to maintain fiscal deficits above 3% of GDP. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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solution to these problems [Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2000]. At present, unilateral euroization 
seems unlikely to be adopted by any of the front runners for EU accession in 2004. Nevertheless, 
the  problems  we  have  identified  remain,  and  in  the  absence  of  unilateral  euroization,  rapid 
adoption of the euro becomes the best remedy.  
The  argument  goes  as  follows:  successful  market  reforms  in  the  transition  applicant 
countries (CEECs) and the perspective of EU accession leads to expectations of rapid economic 
growth. This in turn means that domestic residents wish to save less so as to smooth consumption, 
while  foreign  investors  are  willing  to  provide  the  financing  needed  to  bridge  the  gap  between 
savings  and  investment.  The  result  is  high  capital  account  surpluses  and  their  corollary  high 
current account deficits. This, in turn, makes the CEECs very susceptible to capital inflow “stops” 
(reversals are not necessary) possibly leading to currency crises. In the case of Poland the current 
account deficit has been around 4-8% GDP over the last four years, which is usually considered 
well  within  the  “danger  zone”  in  which  a  currency  “stop”  may  threaten  due  to  fears  of  un-
sustainability by investors. 
  We also argue that neither monetary nor fiscal policies can be counted on to keep these 
developments in check. Under a floating exchange rate regime, contractionary monetary policy will 
cause the domestic currency to appreciate, which may increase the CA deficit even further. In fact, 
very contractionary monetary policy has led to a significant reduction in the current account deficit 
in Poland over the last three years. Our argument is not that this cannot happen, merely that it 
cannot be counted on to happen. Furthermore, the reduction in the CA deficit has occurred at a 
very  high  cost  in  foregone  output  (growth  had  to  fall  sharply  so  as  to  reduce  the  motive  for 
consumption smoothing). Expansionary monetary policy will lead to faster inflation and is likely to 
make  the  achievement  of  the  Maastricht  criteria  impossible.  Under  a  fixed  exchange  rate, 
monetary policy is not available as an instrument. Turning to fiscal policy (which can be used with 
either floating or fixed exchange rate regimes), this may also prove ineffective in improving the CA. 
A tightening of the fiscal stance may simply make foreign lenders more willing to lend to domestic 
private  sector  borrowers  (we  know  that  foreign  investors  do  nowadays  look  at  the  overall 
indebtedness of a country’s residents, both public and private)
4
. In any event, even assuming a 
very high (one to one) correspondence between fiscal and current account changes, reducing a 
current account deficit by three percentage points would involve a politically improbably large fiscal 
adjustment. Expansionary fiscal policy would, in the traditional way, increase aggregate demand 
and thus tend to increase the CA deficit.  
Given the difficulty of reducing high CA deficits, many CEECs are very exposed to the risk 
of a sharp depreciation of their currency, commonly called a currency crisis. In countries with high 
levels  of  “liability  euroization”  [Calvo,  1998]  such  crises  will  lead  to  increases  in  the  real  debt 
burden and to depression (Indonesia post-1997 is a recent example). Many CEECs do not have a 
very high level of liability euroization (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) but even in these 
                                                  
4 The US experience in the 1990s is instructive in this context.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
the need to offset the inflationary effect of a sharp depreciation through higher interest rates could 
well lead to a strongly recessionary effect. In the absence of unilateral euroization, rapid accession 
to EMU is the only way of escaping the choice between slow growth and high exposure to the risk 
of  currency  crisis  (possibly  followed  by  a  prolonged  period  of  slow  growth, as  occurred  in  the 
Czech Republic after the 1996 crisis)5. 
Thus,  the  period  before  CEECs  have  joined  the  EMU  exposes  potentially  fast  growing 
applicant countries to either a high risk of currency crisis, or forces them to grow far more slowly 
than they could. Since real convergence is one of the purposes of EU accession for the CEECs, 
the orthodox path is at variance with the ultimate goal, something which cannot be desirable. This 
is the crux of my argument for early EMU accession for CEECs. 
3. Optimum Currency Area Considerations 
Asymmetric shocks are a danger if a country and the monetary union it proposes joining are 
not  part  of  an  optimum  currency  area  (OCA).  Our  view  is  that  many  CEECs  satisfy  the  OCA 
conditions to the same degree as present members of EMU, or are very close to doing so. Since 
the CEECs are committed by their acceptance of the acquis communautaire to joining the EMU at 
some stage, what is good enough for the EMU's current members should be good enough for the 
CEECs.    Even  if  some  of  the  CEECs  satisfy  OCA  conditions  a  little  less  than  current  EMU 
members, this merely exposes them to slightly higher risks from idiosyncratic shocks than current 
EMU members are exposed to. In making a choice on EMU accession, these slightly higher risks 
must be set against the very high costs described above of keeping one's national currency in the 
pre-accession period.  
The main reason we think that many CEECs are close to satisfying OCA requirements to a 
similar degree as current EMU members is their very high level of trade integration with EMU 
countries. Trade with other members of a currency area as a share of GDP is a good indication of 
the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks to a country's economy are likely to be amortized by its 
trade with the rest of the currency area. Table 1 shows that in 1999 all of the CEECs traded a 
higher share of their GDP with EMU countries than six of the current 12 EMU members (including 
the four largest Germany, France, Italy and Spain) in the year  preceding the launching of the 
euro6. Trade with other members of a currency area as a share of total trade is a good indication of 
                                                  
5 For a balanced assessment of the benefits of “hard peg” exchange rate regimes such as currency boards or 
dollarization see Ghosh et al. 2000. 
6 Most of the CEECs are small countries in terms of population and very small in terms of GDP, and small countries 
tend to have less diversified foreign trade. With the exception of Finland and Greece it is the larger EMU members that 
have lower levels of international trade (and therefore of EMU trade/GDP). They may, therefore offset their lower levels 
of trade with higher levels of diversification. However, it is not clear whether in CEECs the extent of diversification 
depends on GDP or population. Also, small countries may be less affected by a given asymmetric shock than large ones. 
Usually OCA theory assumes that all goods produced by a given sector are identical, irrespective of which country they 
were produced in. However, if there are specificities to the goods produced by different countries, each country will face 
a somewhat downward sloping demand curve for its exports. Such demand curves are likely to be more elastic in the 
case of smaller countries, since they supply a smaller share of the market for their own produce and that of close Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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the  extent  to  which  a  country  would  be  exposed  to  movements  in  the  exchange  rate  of  the 
common currency against the currencies of "third countries": all of the CEECs traded a higher 
share of their total trade with EMU countries than two EMU members, and six of the CEECs traded 
a higher share of total trade with EMU than all but two current EMU members. Thus, if these 
ratios were the only criteria for satisfying OCA requirements, we could already conclude that many 
CEECs satisfy them7. 
It is argued [e.g. Fidrmuc and Schardax, 2000] that a higher share of intra-industry (II) trade 
within a currency area will lead to more synchronous business cycles, because industry specific 
supply or demand shocks are then more likely to be symmetric across countries. We therefore 
measure intra-industry trade with EMU/GDP for EMU members and applicant countries, and find 
that seven CEECs have a share of II trade with EMU/GDP which is higher than that of three EMU 
members. 
                                                                                                                                                               
competitors. A negative asymmetric supply shock to one sector can be compensated by an expansion in a country’s 
other exports, and this is likely to be easier in the case a smaller country. Further empirical study of this question is 
needed. This problem is likely to have less relevance for the second measure of trade with EMU/total trade, where it is 
the largest CEECs which score highest, and they do so against almost all EMU members. 
7 CEECs’ scores on both measures would be somewhat higher if we were considering their exposure to shocks after 
all of them had joined EMU, since CEECs also trade with each other. I am grateful to a referee for this and the preceding 
point. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
 
Table 1. Degree of trade integration of CEECs with EMU compared to that of EMU countries 




Belgium-Lux.               81.4                 59               56.8 
Hungary               73.2                 43               68.7 
Czech Republic               65.1                 43               61.7 
Estonia               62.0                 24               45.1 
Slovenia               61.8                 37               67.1 
Slovakia               58.9                 29               56.8 
Netherlands               48.8                 38               47.9 
Ireland               44.2                 22               33.2 
Bulgaria               39.3                 13               54.2 
Portugal               38.5                 19               67.1 
Austria               37.6                 26               63.2 
Romania               34.7                 10               66.4 
Latvia               30.9                   7               46.8 
Poland               27.6                 12               58.5 
Lithuania               26.5                   6               36.0 
Spain               25.5                 17               58.3 
France               21.7                 18               51.9 
Germany               20.8                 17               43.8 
Finland               20.7                 10               34.0 
Italy               19.5                 12               49.3 
Greece               17.4                   5               53.4 
Source: Eurostat. Data is 1999 for accession countries and 1998 for EMU countries.  
* The shares of intra-industry (II) trade with EMU countries in GDP were estimated by taking the 1997 shares of II trade 
with the EU in Fidrmuc and Schardax [2000] and applying them to columns 2 and 4. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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Intra-industry trade is often classified as coming in one of two varieties. “Horizontal II trade” 
where almost identical goods are exchanged between two trading partners and “vertical II trade”, 
where the goods traded although they come under the same IST classification, differ in some 
important respects. It is usually assumed that a given amount “vertical intra-industry trade” assures 
less correlation between business cycles than the same amount of “horizontal intra-industry trade” 
of almost identical goods. This is not clear for two reasons: (1) if vertical trade depends on the 
supply of components by one side and of finished products by the other, then the two countries’ 
trade and output flows are likely to be very highly correlated indeed; (2) if vertical trade depends on 
exchanging similar products of differing quality, then if CEECs export the lower quality, cheaper 
variants,  the  income  elasticity  of  demand  for  these  is  likely  to  be  lower  than  for  that  of  the 
corresponding EMU country products. In that case, aggregate or sectoral demand shocks in EMU 
economies are likely to affect CEECs less (falls in demand in the EMU will result in smaller falls in 
demand  for  CEECs  exports,  increases  in  demand  in  EMU  will  result  in  smaller  increases  in 
demand for CEEC exports). Thus thanks to “vertical II integration” of this kind, CEECs would be 
less affected by EMU demand shocks than equally II integrated EMU members
8
. 
Moreover,  it  needs  to  be  remembered  that  inter-industry  trade  also  contributes  to  the 
convergence of business cycles in a currency area in the presence of aggregate shocks, be they 
supply or demand shocks. Thus, an increase in aggregate demand in EMU (but not in a particular 
CEEC) will spill over to the CEEC through increased demand for its exports, whatever the nature of 
these.  And  an  asymmetric  increase  in  aggregate  costs,  constituting  a  negative  aggregate 
idiosyncratic supply shock (for instance as a result of increased energy prices which affects the 
CEEC more than EMU) will be partly cushioned by the smaller fall in EMU output and therefore 
demand9.  
Thus,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  studies  show  that  business  cycles  are  more  correlated 
between the advanced CEECs and Germany than between important EMU members. Boone and 
Maurel  [1999],  using  de-trended  unemployment,  show  that  between  55%  (Poland)  and  86% 
(Hungary) of the advanced CEECs' cycles are explained by German cycles, whereas only 43% of 
Spanish and 18% of Italian cycles can be explained in this way. Fidrmuc and Schardax [2000] find 
that Poland's industrial production is as closely correlated with Germany's as is Austria's, and more 
so than those of Switzerland or Italy. Hungary and Slovenia's industrial outputs are more closely 
correlated with Germany's than is that of Italy, although those of the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
are far less correlated.  
More  recent  work  by  Karhonen  and  Fidrmuc  [2001]  improves  on  previous  research  by 
correlating EMU members’ and CEECs’ supply and demand shocks with those of the EMU as a 
                                                  
8 On the reasonable assumption that any monetary policy response to such a shock for the EMU as a whole would 
not fully offset the effects of the shock. 
9 This is not to deny that the effects of such a shock might be even more muted if the CEEC’s currency could 
depreciate in such a situation. But we are not talking here of the choice between accession or not for the CEECs, but 
rather about whether they are less suited to accession than current EMU members. It is in this context that it is important 
to remember the role of inter-industry trade in muting the effects of shocks even in a currency union.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
whole10. The research shows that Hungary and Estonia seem to have least to loose by giving up 
their  domestic  currency,  followed  by  Poland.  The  remaining  CEECs  either  have  very  low 
correlations on both kinds of shock, or reasonable ones on one kind of shock but negative ones of 
a similar size on the other kind. Finally, Lithuania seems to have quite large negative correlations 
on both kinds of shock. However, much of the data used in the research comes from quite a few 
years ago, and since trade integration has proceeded apace, one may suppose that the correlation 
of CEECs’ shocks to EMU shocks (of both kinds) has increased. 
4. Is there a trade-off between Real and Nominal Convergence? 
It is clear that if countries were able to use national monetary policy to mitigate the effects of 
demand shocks (both negative and positive) and to use exchange rate policy to mitigate the effects 
of negative supply shocks, the path of GDP would be smoother (which would increase welfare 
somewhat),  and  the  trend  rate  of  growth  might  even  be  somewhat  higher  (less  risk  could 
encourage higher investment).  
Nevertheless,  in  general,  catch-up  is  a  pretty  long-term  phenomenon.  Convergence 
between  similar  regions  (US  states,  Japanese  prefectures,  European  regions)  proceeds  at 
between 2% and 4% of the initial gap per annum [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1998], which implies a 
half-life for the productivity gap of between 18 and 36 years. This is not a period over which the 
availability or otherwise of tools for flexible macro policy is likely to be decisive, even if one were to 
assume that macro policy smoothes fluctuations rather than augmenting them.  
But this is exactly where the “rub” lies. Monetary policy in robust young democracies with 
strong populist movements and limited human capital at the central bank can easily be pro-cyclical 
rather than anti-cyclical. Exchange rate movements can also be more of a “shock generator” than a 
shock  absorber.  A  recent  study  [Habib  2002]  finds  that  emerging  market  risk  premia  had  a 
significant impact on exchange rates in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland during the period 
mid-1997 – mid- 2001, and on interest rates in the Czech Republic and Hungary. The volatility of 
the Czech and Polish exchange rates was also affected by “volatility contagion” coming from the 
emerging markets and there was also some “volatility contagion” of Czech interest rates. Csermely 
and Vonnak [2002] show that in Hungary the main reason for exchange rate and real interest rate 
movements has been changes in the risk premium Hungary has had to pay. These changes were 
due to world market increases in the premium required of emerging markets, an effect which would 
very largely disappear after EMU accession. 
Thus,  I  would  argue  that  a  monetary  union  which  eliminated  the  risk  of  “emerging  market 
contagion” and  made a  higher  level  of  capital  inflow  safe,  while  at  the  same  time  providing  a 
strong, externally guaranteed anti-inflationary framework (which might in turn encourage a higher 
                                                  
10 The period covered depends on the availability of statistics, but for EMU countries it is for 1991 Q3 – 2000 Q3 or 
Q4. For CEECs it ends in 2000 Q4 (except for Slovakia, which ends in 2000 Q3) and begins as early as 1992 Q1 
(Romania) or as late as 1995 Q2 (Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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level of domestic savings), might be expected to increase the long term rate of growth of the 
CEECs, rather than reduce it.  
Another argument which has been put forward is that CEECs need to run fiscal deficits in 
excess  of  the  limit  set  by  the  Maastricht  criterion  and of  the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. One justification for this view is that CEECs have poor physical infrastructures, that 
infrastructural investment can often boost economic growth, and that therefore a higher level of 
borrowing for public investment needs is justified in the case of CEECs [European Economy, 2002, 
Part V]. This is an argument for a certain kind of public expenditure rather than for financing that 
expenditure  through  borrowing.  Such  investment  can  also  be  financed  by  reducing  other 
expenditure or increasing taxation. However, if we were to accept that borrowing was the best way 
of financing under the special circumstances which CEECs face, then rather than require that they 
choose between EMU membership and an optimal investment/financing mix, it is the Maastricht 
fiscal  deficit  criterion  which  should  be  altered11.  Finally,  it  needs  to  be  remembered  that  the 
requirements for fiscal prudence in the Treaties apply to non-EMU-participating EU member states 
as well12. 
5. Should rapid catch-up disqualify CEECs from EMU membership? 
Prominent ESCB officials have argued that not just nominal but also “real” convergence should 
be required of CEECs before they join EMU. Thus Hans Reckers, a Bundesbank Board member, 
has argued that CEECs should not be allowed to join EMU before they had achieved GDP per 
capita levels equivalent to 70% of the EU average [Financial Times, 26 Sept. 2000].  In fact, the 
value or stability of a currency has nothing to do with the income of the people who use it. Were 
this the case, West European currencies would have been much more stable in the 1970s than in 
the 1870s, whereas the opposite was the case13. 
                                                  
11 A variant of this argument is that the EU itself requires various expenditures (for instance on environmental 
protection). These can be thought of as the “admission price” to the EU, which is worth paying because other aspects of 
accession will boost growth in such a way as to more than compensate for it. If the optimal method of financing these 
expenditures were borrowing, then rather than excluding the CEECs from EMU or forcing them to finance the admission 
price in a sub-optimal way, it would again be better to adjust the fiscal deficit criterion appropriately. 
12 All EU members are obliged to avoid excessive deficits (defined as those in excess of 3% of GDP) under the 
Maastricht Treaty, whether they are EMU members or not (the sole exception is once again the UK, which is only obliged 
to  “attempt  to  avoid”  an  excessive  deficit).  Only  EMU  members  can  be  fined  for  failing,  but  the  legal  requirement 
nevertheless  remains.  Furthermore,  any  member  state  which  has  an  excessive  deficit  should  be  unable  to  obtain 
financing for any new projects under the EU Cohesion Fund, something which is of great importance for some CEECs, 
such as Poland [Ecofin 1999, Art 2, Para 4 and Art 6, Para 1]. Finally, all EU members are obliged to achieve “a fiscal 
position close to balance or in surplus” in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. Neither EMU nor non-EMU 
members can be fined for failing to fulfil this requirement either, although again both will loose access to the Cohesion 
Fund if they are found by the Council to be in breach of the Pact [Ecofin 1999, Art 1, Para 1]. 
13 It may be the case that a certain minimum level of income is required for a society to be able to support various 
sophisticated institutions, such as advanced forms of banking supervision, which may be helpful in protecting the political 
system from demands for inflationary finance. However, the more advanced CEECs already have such institutions in 
place.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
One  argument  that  has  been  made  is  that  the  Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson  (H-B-S)  effect 
means that CEECs are likely to have inflation rates 0%-2% above the average of the present EMU. 
On top of this there may be a demand effect resulting from the demand for non-tradeables being 
more income elastic than the demand for tradeables. As incomes rise, demand for non-tradeables 
rises faster, and unless productivity in the sector rises faster than in the whole economy (which is 
unlikely) non-tradeable prices will rise faster than tradeable prices. This phenomenon of “growth 
related relative price changes” also happens in current EMU members, but with faster income 
growth, it would presumably happen faster in CEECs. Adding faster growing countries with higher 
H-B-S and “demand effect” inflation to EMU must increase EMU inflation for any given degree of 
tightness of monetary policy it is argued. This seems to confront the EMU with an unpleasant 
dilemma: if the 2% ceiling on inflation is to be maintained for the EMU as a whole, interest rates will 
have to be higher and inflation in slow growing countries will need to be lower than at present. On 
the other hand, abandoning the 2% ceiling on inflation and allowing CEECs to have inflation rates 
well above the average of present EMU members (without reducing inflation in the current member 
states) would, it is claimed, undermine price stability in the whole zone.  
However, we have to take a number of other considerations into account.  
First, both the H-B-S effect proper and the demand effect, are as likely to occur in any 
rapidly growing economy as in a CEEC. Indeed, these effects have appeared quite strongly in 
Ireland, and to a lesser extent in Spain. They are not particularly the effect of catch-up, but simply 
of faster growth in the country concerned than the EMU on average. Thus, in order to prevent 
these effects from raising the average inflation rate in the EMU, members should not only refuse to 
accept  CEECs,  but  they  should  also  prevent  current  members  from  unilaterally  undertaking 
structural reforms which would accelerate their growth14. Indeed, such a moratorium on reform 
would be particularly important since the CEECs represent only about 6.5% of EMU GDP. Thus, 
structural  reforms  that  increased  the  growth  rate  by  half  in  France  and  Italy  (which  together 
account for about 40% of EMU GDP) would be likely to have a much larger effect on EMU inflation 
than the accession of the CEECs. 
Therefore, unless the EMU wishes to remain a low growth zone, there can be no argument 
for  excluding  CEECs  on  such  a  basis.  Indeed,  it  may  be  in  recognition  of  this  fact,  that  the 
Maastricht  inflation  criterion  only  needs  to  be  fulfilled  for  one  year.  Although  the  reduction  in 
inflation does need to be sustainable to satisfy the MIC, it is hard to imagine that expectations of 
“growth generated relative price changes” of the kind we are discussing after the conclusion of the 
“reference period”, could be held to violate this condition
15
.  
                                                  
14 This would be particularly vital if countries are to avoid the “demand effect”. 
15 The “reference period” is that for which the conformity of a country with the criteria is assessed. What could be 
targeted by the sustainability requirement, would be various tricks such as “delaying” administered price or negotiated 
wage  increases  into  “post-examination”  years,  or  the  fulfilment  of  the  criterion  thanks  to  an  unsustainable  nominal 
appreciation. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
15 
Second, the CEECs are so small economically that their accession to EMU would not in fact 
require any change in the ECB’s inflation target, even if their “growth inflation” were relatively high. 
Thus, if CEEC inflation were an improbably high 3 percentage points above the average of current 
EMU members, this would mean an increase in enlarged EMU inflation of 0.2%, on the assumption 
that there were no offsetting effects. If France and Italy increased their long-term growth rate by 
half,  the  effect  could  be  twice  as  large  (if  we  assume  that  the  inflation  effect  of  a  growth 
acceleration would be about half of the acceleration)16. Of course, even if the EMU-wide inflation 
target were adjusted upwards to take “growth inflation” in parts of the zone into account, there 
would not be any need to adjust the ECB’s monetary policy, and therefore there should not be any 
effect on the inflation rate in slow growing countries.  
Third, it is not in fact clear that either the H-B-S effect or the demand effect on non-tradeables 
prices in the faster growing countries, would in fact increase the inflation rate in EMU as a whole, 
once  we  take  the  impact  of  the  higher  growth  on  the  nominal  exchange  rate  of  the  euro  into 
account. 
To see this, let us imagine that all EMU countries increase their growth rates by half. Would 
this lead to higher inflation within EMU? Assuming a stability- oriented monetary policy there are 
four ways of thinking about what would happen: 
·  To the extent that the higher growth was mainly generated by productivity increases in 
the traded sector (leading to an H-B-S effect), it would lead to a nominal appreciation 
of the euro against other currencies (we assume that the growth acceleration would be 
limited to the EMU). Domestic EMU prices of tradeables would fall (or fall more rapidly 
than  they  are  in  any  case  doing  before  the  acceleration),  compensating  for  the 
increase in the prices of non-tradeables and overall inflation would remain roughly 
constant17.  
·  To the extent to which the productivity growth occurred in non-tradeables, prices in this 
sector would not rise in the first place18.  
·  To the extent to which we have a shift in the structure of demand from tradeables to 
non-tradeables,  the  euro  zone’s  balance  of  payments  will  improve  ceteris  paribus, 
leading to nominal appreciation of the euro, reducing the euro price of tradeables and 
thus  compensating  for  the  increase  in  non-tradeables  prices19.  The  nominal 
appreciation also increases the marginal costs of producing tradeables in the EMU 
                                                  
16 The same assumption applied to an excess of CEEC inflation of 3 percentage points above the EMU average 
inflation during 2000-2002 of 2.5%, would imply improbably high CEEC-wide growth rates of 7-8% per annum. 
17 As long as the domestic price elasticity of demand for both categories of goods (tradeables and non-tradeables) 
were the same. 
18 As long as the “structure of demand” effect on the demand for non-tradeables, resulting from the higher income 
the accelerated growth brings, is not larger than the growth in productivity in non-tradeables. 
19 The shift is in the structure of demand, so euro zone demand for tradeables is likely to grow in absolute terms. 
This is because the shift itself results from overall growth in the economy.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
relative to their world price (in dollars) and leads to resources being transferred inside 
the euro area to non-tradeables production.  
·  To  the  extent  to  which  higher  growth  is  balanced  across  sectors  and  there  is  no 
“demand  effect”,  prices  of  non-tradeables  would  not  rise.  However,  higher  growth 
would lead to pressure for higher real interest rates, which would also lead to nominal 
appreciation of the euro, which would cause the price of tradeables to decline, and 
overall inflation actually to fall. 
We can now consider what happens when the increase in growth is not EMU-wide. In the case 
when  it  is  limited  only  to  France  and  Italy,  we  would  have  weaker  H-B-S  or  “demand  effect” 
impacts on EMU-wide non-tradeables prices, more or less compensated by an equivalently weaker 
nominal appreciation of the euro. In the last case above, of “fully balanced” growth acceleration20 
in France and Italy, the real interest rate effect on tradeables prices would also be weaker than in 
the case of an equally large EMU-wide growth acceleration.  
In all of these scenarios the impact of such a “geographically unbalanced” growth acceleration 
on  slower  growing  countries  within  EMU  could  nevertheless  be  quite  unpleasant.  Nominal 
appreciation  of  the  euro  would  make  some  part  of  their  tradeables  output  non-competitive  at 
previously  expected  wages.  We  can  see  this  if  we  initially  assume  the  existence  a  single 
homogeneous tradeable good, for which world demand and world supply are perfectly elastic. This 
good is produced in different currency areas of the world according to production functions which 
differ between areas in the short term, and which generate increasing marginal costs in production. 
Area output is determined at the level at which the world price PT = MCT (domestic marginal cost). 
Resources (at least two factors) used in the production of the tradeable good are also used in the 
production of each area’s non-tradeable good. An increase in productivity in the production of the 
tradeable good in an area leads to an increase in area income and therefore to a change in the 
structure  of  demand.  Assuming  that  this  causes  a  greater  increase  in  demand  for  the  non-
tradeable good in the area than for the tradeable, the price of the non-tradeable good will rise. This 
implies a real appreciation of the area’s currency, and in a non-inflationary environment, a nominal 
appreciation  of  the  currency  as  well.  Resources  are  then  transferred  from  production  of  the 
tradeable to the non-tradeable good, which will additionally benefit the suppliers of the factors of 
production which are used more intensively in the production of the non-tradeable good (by the 
Rybczyński Theorem).  
“Regions”  within  the  currency  area  (in  the  EMU  case  these  could  be  countries  such  as 
Germany) in which productivity in the production of the tradeable good does not increase, will find 
that with nominal appreciation, domestic PT will fall. If domestic factor prices are flexible in such a 
region,  this  may  cause  a  fall  in  nominal  returns  to  factors  of  production  which  are  relatively 
immobile out of the region (labour). If domestic factor prices are downwardly sticky, it will cause a 
fall in the output of the tradeable good in the region, and a reduction in employment. Thus, in order 
                                                  
20 Fully balanced on both the demand and supply sides in both sectors. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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to avoid an increase in unemployment, expected wage increases might have to be foregone, or in 
the case of a relatively strong effect, real (or even nominal) wages might have to fall. This latter 
case is made the more likely by the low level of the ECB’s inflation target.  
Of course, on average even the inhabitants of slow growing EMU-members will benefit from 
faster growth anywhere in EMU (or indeed in the world). But these gains are likely to be unevenly 
distributed, with consumers of tradeable goods benefiting more than their producers. Thus, if we 
assume two tradeable goods are produced in the world, the currency area and the region we have 
been considering, and that productivity increases in the production of only one of the two tradeable 
goods in one of the regions of our area (but not in the other region or the rest of the world) then we 
get  the  following  effects:  (1)  the  area’s  currency  still  appreciates;  (2)  in  the  region  in  which 
productivity has increased, resources are transferred from the production of the both tradeable 
goods to the non-tradeable good; (3) in the region in which productivity has not increased, there 
are two rounds of effects. The first round involves, as before, a reduction in the profit maximizing 
level of output of both tradeable goods at given factor prices. This requires either a fall in output 
and an increase in unemployment, or a fall in regional factor prices (relative to other regions and in 
nominal  terms  in  a  non-inflationary  environment).  The  second  round  is  a  consequence  of  the 
overall currency area growth which has resulted from the increased productivity in the production 
of one of the tradeable goods in the other region of the area. This increases area demand for the 
other  tradeable  good  (in  whose  production  productivity  has  not  increased),  which  increases 
demand for the factors used intensively in the production of this second tradeable good. The non-
growing region should benefit from this, as it can increase exports of the second tradeable good to 
the growing region. Which of these two (first or second round) effects will predominate depends on 
the size of the slow growing region relative to the area and on the various elasticities involved. If 
factor prices are highly flexible downwards, then the region will not loose from the first round effect 
and will gain (albeit maybe only slightly) from the second round effect.  
In the case of CEEC accession and subsequent catch up, the direction of the effects on EMU 
slow growers would be the same as in the two cases examined above, but their magnitude is likely 
to be far smaller21. Thus, to summarise, the problem with CEEC accession to EMU is not that it will 
cause higher inflation in the whole euro zone, but rather that it may cause higher unemployment in 
slow  growing  countries  such  as  Germany  if  they  fail  to  increase  the  flexibility  of  their  labour 
markets. 
                                                  
21 Throughout the analysis we assume that the EMU does not face a downward sloping demand curve for its 
products. If it does, then productivity growth in the tradeables sector will lead to a nominal depreciation of the euro 
rather  than  an  appreciation,  whether  it  is  balanced  by  equal  productivity  growth  in  non-tradeables  or  not.  Nominal 
depreciation will put upward pressure on EMU inflation, which would need to be offset by higher nominal interest rates. If 
the tradeable goods produced by all EMU countries were homogeneous, producers in countries with slow productivity 
growth would be hit by competition from their neighbours and by higher real interest rates. To the extent to which the 
tradeables produced by different countries differed, producers in slower growing EMU countries would face only the 
second problem of higher real exchange rates. However, only areas with largely undiversified exports (such as raw 
materials producers) are likely to face demand curves which are downward sloping in the medium to long term (the time 
horizon which concerns us, as we are considering issues of differential growth rates). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
6. EMU institutional issues  
One reason for the Maastricht criteria for EMU accession is that EMU membership gives a 
country voting rights in the ECB and the Eurogroup of the Ecofin, and existing members would not 
want countries that have not demonstrated a commitment to low inflation to have such a vote.  
This is especially important in the case of the ECB. Although the ECB is supposed to make 
policy for the EMU as a whole, and therefore small economies should have a small weight in its 
considerations, each member of the interest rate setting ECB Governing Council (GC) has one 
vote at present. Apart from the six Executive Board (EB) members, the governors of all the NCBs 
are members of the Governing Council (giving a total of 18 members in the GC). This is a concern 
given  that  there  are  at  present  12  potential  new  members  from  central,  eastern  and  southern 
Europe.  The  Nice  summit  of  December  2000  asked  the  ECB  to  make  proposals  for  the 
restructuring of the Governing Council, and the ECB has now done this. 
The current member states of the EMU may be concerned that most of the potential new 
members have recent histories of far higher inflation than Western Europe. The fear could be that 
they would not have the same commitment to price stability as existing members. We have called 
this the “price-stability culture problem” [Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2002]. This problem is partly 
offset by the fact that central bankers are not as a breed prone to be inflation lovers. Second, all 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) member banks now have to be highly independent for 
countries to qualify for EU, let alone EMU, accession. Indeed, the opposite fear has also been 
expressed: central bankers of CEECs might vote for short-term interest rates which kept inflation 
under control in their own countries, but were too high for core countries such as Germany. 
It has also been claimed that a Governing Council of 28 members would be far too large for 
serious  discussion  of  the  merits  of  monetary  policy  issues,  which  are  best  decided  in  a  small 
group. It is said that in the ECB the tradition has been not to vote but to reach consensus and, it 
has been argued, reaching consensus in a group of twenty odd could be time consuming. Neither 
of these arguments seems to have any real merit. It is impossible to believe that consensus is at 
present arrived at in the 18 member Council through general discussion. What seems far more 
likely is that there is a smaller group with a clear view, and the rest go along with that. Compared to 
this, voting at least has the advantage of transparency. Moreover, the practical irrelevance of this 
argument has been demonstrated by the ECB’s own proposal for the reform, which foresees a GC 
of 21 voting members, and that all “National Central Bank Governors will continue to participate in 
the discussions of the Governing Council and attend the meetings…” - which implies up to 33 
participants [ECB, 2002]. 
Third, there is the serious matter of the unfairness of the present arrangement, which with its 
“one governor one vote” principle, favours small countries enormously, even if all the members of 
the  executive  board  were  drawn  from  large  countries  (which  has  not  been  the  case).  The 
admission  of  the  present  applicant  countries  merely  exacerbates  and  highlights  the  problem. 
Nevertheless, this problem has now been largely solved by the ECB’s proposal for the reform of Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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the GC. This envisions 6 board members and 15 rotating country representatives. The 5 largest 
countries in terms of their shares of GDP will have 4 votes rotating among them22. The remaining 
countries  will  be  divided  into  two  groups  as  follows:  the  next  largest  one  half  of  all  the  EMU-
participating  countries  by  GDP  will  have  8  votes  to  rotate  amongst  themselves,  while  all  the 
remaining countries will have 3 votes to rotate among themselves23. 
Membership in the eurogroup of the Ecofin Council of Finance Ministers may therefore be a 
more sensitive issue for some within the present EU. The European Commission (EC) and the 
twelve eurozone members have put forward proposals to the EU’s Constitutional Convention that 
the eurogroup should cease being an informal forum for discussion, and should be allowed to take 
binding executive decisions and pass legislation for the eurozone in the same way that the wider 
Ecofin does for the EU as whole [Financial Times June 10, 2003]. Indeed, one might expect that as 
regards macroeconomic issues the importance of the decisions that would be taken by the new 
“EMU-Ecofin” may prove to be even greater than those that are at present taken by the EU-wide 
Ecofin. Thus, it has been argued that, because it shares a single currency, the EMU needs a far 
greater degree of co-ordination of fiscal policies than does the EU as whole [Jacquet and Pisani-
Ferry, 1999]. If CEECs were admitted to the EMU they would be entitled to participate in any 
strengthened “EMU-Ecofin”. Voting rights in Ecofin are roughly determined according to population, 
with  an  additional  advantage  being  given  to  smaller  countries24.  There  are  also  quirks  in  the 
allocation of voting rights. Thus, according to the rules adopted in the Treaty of Nice, Poland will 
have 27 votes compared to Germany’s 29 in all the “chambers” of the Council of the European 
Union”, despite having half of its population and a tenth of its national income25. These proportions 
would hold within any “EMU-Ecofin” as well. Thus it is not surprising that large and rich states 
within EMU might not be enthusiastic about poor states, that would contribute a small proportion of 
EMU GDP, joining EMU.   
Furthermore, the European Commission wants to have the “EMU-Ecofin” granted legislative 
and executive powers for two reasons. First, this may be the only way in which it would be possible 
to establish a central authority for making fiscal policy decisions which could be made binding on 
EMU member states, as these might be unwilling to see non-EMU members participating in such 
decisions  within  the  wider,  presently  existing  Ecofin  [Financial  Times,  2003].  Second,  the 
constitutional principle in the EU is that the Council of the Union (of which Ecofin is an embodiment 
and  an  “EMU-Ecofin”  would  be)  votes  usually  on  proposals  put  before  it  by  the  Commission.  
                                                  
22  The  actual  criterion  is  a  composite  indicator  of  each  country’s  supposed  “representativeness”  of  the  EMU 
economy as a whole. This indicator is composed in 5/6 of GDP and in 1/6 of the total assets of the aggregated balance 
sheet of monetary financial institutions (TABS-MFI). It is unlikely that TABS-MFI will significantly affect the allocation of 
Member States to the three groups. 
23 The third group will only come into existence when the number of states participating in EMU reaches 22. 
24 Since the voting rules are laid down by treaty it would be extremely hard to change them, so as to take account of 
GDP for example (as we suggested could be done in the case of the ECB by weighting votes by members shares in ECB 
capital). Such a move would also be seen as profoundly anti-democratic.  
25 Economics and Finance (Ecofin), Agriculture, Environment, Foreign Affairs, etc. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – When Should the Central Europeans Join EMU?  
Empowering “EMU-Ecofin” is therefore probably a necessary step for empowering the Commission 
itself in the sphere of EMU wide fiscal policy making, and therefore also fiscal policy co-ordination 
within EMU26. Thus, the expectation that CEECs will be admitted to the EMU and therefore to the 
“EMU-Ecofin” undermines the likelihood of large and rich EMU members agreeing to the creation 
of a powerful “EMU-Ecofin”. Knowledge of this may well lie at the root of Commission antipathy to 
EMU  accession  by  CEECs27.  However,  this  antipathy  may  decline  once  the  Constitutional 
Convention finishes its work28.  
It should also be pointed out that whereas it is not in fact very dangerous, from the point of 
view of maintaining the commitment to price stability, to admit CEEC central bankers to the ECB 
Governing Council (given central bankers usual preferences), the same cannot necessarily be said 
as regards the effects on sound public finance of admitting CEEC finance ministers to a powerful 
“EMU-Ecofin”. The risk of doing so may be perceived as even greater if the Stability and Growth 
Pact is seriously watered down29.  
7. Conclusion  
Thus, the balance of the argument appears to lie definitely on the side of EMU accession when 
we  look  at  it  from  the  perspective  of  the  CEECs’  interests.  However,  from  the  perspective  of 
incumbent  EMU  members’  interests,  although  we  can  state  that  many  of  the  arguments  put 
forward against early EMU accession have been overblown, we cannot avoid the conclusion that 
the arguments are more finely balanced. This is especially the case when we analyse the situation 
of slow growing incumbents, who are also likely to be members of any “core” grouping, and that of 
a Commission that is eager to expand its powers into fiscal policy and fiscal policy co-ordination. 
Given the opposing interests between the two sides, and the fact that it is impossible to forbid EU 
members from joining EMU if they fulfil the Maastricht criteria, we can expect to see an intensified 
effort by the Commission and certain incumbent Member States to dissuade CEECs from joining 
                                                  
26 The latter becomes all the more important as the “Stability and Growth Pact” which was supposed to provide a 
framework for such co-ordination comes under increasing strain. 
27 Strangely, Germany does not seem to oppose the strengthened role of the Commission in EMU fiscal policy, 
even  though  under  the  Nice  Treaty  the  role  of  small  countries  in  the  Commission  will  be  further  dramatically 
strengthened, as not only will 9 new small countries join (and only 1 large country) join, but also all countries (large and 
small)  will  have  only  1  Commissioner  (until  now  large  countries  have  had  2  Commissioners).  Nevertheless,  this 
increased  influence  may  be  offset  by  the  influence  of  the  large  countries  within  the  Commission’s  bureaucracy, 
developing a more hierarchical structure for the Commission (with more power for its President and - probably large 
country - Vice-Presidents), and by ensuring the appointment of a large country Commissioner to the crucial Economics 
and Finance Directorate-General. I am grateful to Fabrizio Coricelli for these points.  
28  If  the  Convention  rejects  the  Commission’s  proposal.  If  instead  the  proposal  is  accepted,  we  may  expect 
continued  Commission  opposition  to  CEEC  accession  to  EMU  until  the  new  EU  constitution,  which  would  have  to 
incorporate the proposal, is ratified.  
29 Recent suggestions for watering down the Stability and Growth Pact include: (1) using cyclically adjusted deficits; 
(2) excluding net investment spending from the deficit; (3) providing an allowance for low public debt/GDP levels; (4) 
being more lenient towards countries with low inflation; (5) excluding defence spending [The Business, 10/11 November 
2002, p.11, London]. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 253 – Jacek Rostowski 
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EMU. There may even be an attempt to return to the idea of tightening the accession criteria, 
although this would be hard to square with the principle of “equality between present and future 
Member States”30. 
 
                                                  
30 This principle is claimed to be the basis for the Commission’s opposition to unilateral euroization [European 
Commission, 2000].  
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